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Abstract
Terrorist activities in the Lake Chad Basin region of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon,
have impacted negatively on the security, socio-political and economic situations in the region.
This paper investigates the evolution of insurgency and the factors leading to its growth in the
region. It also examines its socio-political, economic and security implications. Nigeria, in the
centre of the imbroglio, has had no respite from terrorist activities for a long time. Boko Haram
has carried out many gun attacks and bombings in many strategic places, including the United
Nations building in Abuja, the federal capital city. There have been similar attacks in Cameroon,
Chad and Niger, including a massive attack in Bosso in the Niger Republic with 26 soldiers
killed in 2016. This article concludes that the wave of terrorism in the subregion has a
connection to the wave of global terrorism. To stem the tide of insurgency in the subregion, this
paper recommends that governments at all levels should create enabling environment for
investment and industrial growth. It also suggests that security of lives and properties should be
given utmost priority. This paper examines the evolution, manifestations, and course of the Boko
Haram insurgency in the subregion, exploring the implications for national and international
security, socioeconomic order, political stability, and sustainable development of the area. It will
suggest ways to curtail the Boko Haram insurgency and probable future insurgencies in the
subregion.
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The global incidence of terrorism has increased alarmingly since September 11, 2001.
The concerted efforts embarked upon by the international community to ensure its elimination
have been noted but have hitherto proved inadequate. This increase is not unconnected with the
balance of terror and the wave of global insecurity that shaped the beginning of the 21st century;
it is the product of unresolved issues of the Cold War and the continuation of the ideological war
between the west and the Islamic fundamentalism. Africa, and indeed Nigeria, have in the past
decade been bedevilled by an increased incidence of insurgencies, recording a high level of
destruction of both property and lives. The most recent rebellion in the Lake Chad Basin Area is
the Boko Haram uprising which emanated from Nigeria in July 2009. Other examples of the
terror siege on Nigeria and Africa in general were the Maitatsine uprising of the 1980s in
Nigeria, the Al-Shabaab in Somalia and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, which is a menace to peace
and security in the region. Since the advent of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region, the security
situation has been in a state of confusion.
Since 2009, Boko Haram has attacked the Northeast of Nigeria, capturing territories and
spreading to some parts of the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) region of Niger, Chad and Cameroon.
Nigeria started an onslaught on Boko Haram at the onset of its activities in the Northeast;
however, before the formation of the joint task force by the Lake Chad Basin regional
authorities, the activities of the sect had spread to neighbouring countries. Apparently the
terrorists targeted these countries for attacks in retribution for their participation in the regional
joint task force and for daring to support Nigeria’s efforts in quelling the insurgency (Enobi and
Johnson-Rokosu, 2016: 25-41). The cost of combating the attacks and defeating the terrorist
group has been confounding and has already taken its toll on the LCB. Fighting the scourge of
terrorist war in the LCB has been monumental for an impoverished region that for years had
been struggling with deforestation and other human activities due to climate change.
Boko Haram, according to Anyadike (2013) set not only a precedent but also
strengthened an attempt by the Nigerian Islamic conservative elements to impose a different
Islamic religious ideology on a secular Nigerian state in particular. Other insurgencies in the
subregion include the Tuareg rebellion of 2007-2009 led by the Sahara Desert Tuaregs of
northern Mali and the Niger Republic. Chad has been inundated with a series of crises such as
the Chadian civil war of 2005-2010, which has created a mass of disgruntled elements in that
country. These disgruntled elements have served as a reservoir for recruitment for insurgency
groups. Cameroon has been relatively peaceful, with a major exception being the February 2008
uprising due to a hike in fuel prices at the pump in that country. The aftermath of this unrest has
left scars that must be managed by the government. Without the support of the international
community and international antiterrorist agencies, such as the European Union, the region might
not be able to defeat the scourge of terrorism. The situation has been compounded where such
uprisings came with a level of political undertone, such as the accusation that trailed the
emergence of Boko Haram at the onset. In Nigeria, the sitting government between 2011 and
2015 had accused the opposition of fanning the ember of disunity as a result of its failure at the
polls.
Conceptual Analysis
The development of societies to meet the needs of the people for peaceful coexistence has
been dynamic to the extent that for many decades, issues relating to security have taken center
stage. In other words, development process has been preoccupied with the discourse on how
societies should function for the benefit of its people. The notion of security is not a new
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phenomenon. Even in primitive societies, it has always remained a central issue in the discourse
on the social relationships in which people willingly surrender their rights to ensure peaceful
coexistence.
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a paradigm shift from the former statecentric perspective which emphasizes military and economic power rather than the pursuit of
ideals or ethics. This state-centric view is intended to satisfy the needs of the nation-state and its
institutions rather than the interest of the citizenry. Today’s view is more pragmatic and places a
premium on human security with the main thrust on issues relating to human rights and
individual security, and from military to non-military issues (Krahmann, 2003:9). It is to be
noted that the military should not undertake national security issues dealing with matters such as
the economic basis for strategic forces, problems of structural system maintenance, and other
related security issues belonging to the domain of other agencies of government. Societies,
therefore, adopt an inclusive definition of security that takes into consideration all aspects of
state functions, which can lead to a dysfunctional situation if neglected. The contemporary
concept of security analysis is, therefore, a far cry from the old belief that national security
resides solely with the military. Social issues that directly impact on the citizenry are more
germane in the modern conception of security. These social issues include protection of
fundamental rights and maintaining a nonviolent environment, healthy living, freedom from
socioeconomic and political exploitation, and protection from environmental threats.
Although the complexities involved in the concept of security are enormous, the most
important issue here is that the term and its understanding show that it is vital for national
cohesion, peace and sustainable development. Igbuzor (2011:2), therefore submits that security
forms a condition that ensures safety from harm, the defense and protection of the populace, and
absence of threats. Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2013) opine that security is the ability of a nation to
ensure that its people are free from danger or threats to develop their potential, engage in
promoting their cherished values, enhance their well-being and pursue legitimate interests under
an atmosphere conducive to doing so.
Ensuring internal security for the promotion of core values and socio-political and
economic development must therefore be the primary objectives of the government. In
furtherance of this objective, therefore, national security that avoids desecration of the nation’s
core values and prevents violent conflicts is a desideratum for economic growth and
development of any country and must be embraced. In other words, security is vital to
maintaining peace for the socioeconomic and political development of a nation, and the attempt
to prevent violent conflict either originating from within or outside the state must be vigorously
pursued (Stan, 2004: 2). Despite the continued presence of terrorism in international and
domestic life, there is currently no concise, universally accepted definition of the term or of who
we should regard as a terrorist. Therefore, the concept remains a global enigma. The argument
put forward by Anger (2002) therefore suffices with its contention that a definition of terrorism
has been contested due to political sentiments attached to it rather than semantics. From this
perspective, the description of terrorism may depend on the political divides to which one
belongs or to the institution applying the term, as well as the current situation. The duo of Nelson
Mandela and Yasser Arafat were once described as terrorists by the United States but were later
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. This demonstrates that the term “terrorism” can be highly
controversial as well as political.
The main issue here is that every party has defined the term to suit its motive or purpose.
Ruby (2002: 9-14) however, reasons that semantic vagueness has resulted in difficulty to define
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the phenomenon and the inability of scholars to have a consensus on its definition. Ruby went
further to state that researchers on terrorism tend to use the same term to refer to a wide range of
events. In this context, people have described terrorism as killing innocent people, shootings in
public places by a lone gunman, and as a violent attack by the state. Looking at this description,
it seems that there are many characteristics of terrorism, but scholars tend to pick the aspects
most suitable to them when researching it. Terrorism characterised by violence is a disturbing
phenomenon which is not new in human history. What differentiates the violence in terrorism
from other types of violence such as that used against soldiers in defense of the state is that
innocent civilians are mostly targeted. The idea behind such acts against civilians is to cause
terror or panic among the civil population, and of course, to render the state ungovernable.
Omar Lizardo (2008:91-118) however, sees terrorism as a “premeditated use or threat of
use of extra-normal violence or brutality by sub-national groups to obtain political, religious, or
ideological objectives through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved in
the policy-making that the terrorists seek to influence.” It would not be out of place to argue that
the definition of terrorism is replete with dimensional semantics. Malden, (2004) defines
terrorism as an asymmetrical warfare of threat and violence targeted against enemies by
deploying unconventional means not within the forms of political struggle routinely operating
within some current regime. This symbolism is reflective of the European Union’s definition that
terrorism is geared to intimidate the population or to compel a government to unduly carry out or
abstain from performing a particular act, or to cause a major political social or constitutional
order to destabilise the polity. Thus, these perceptual differences will linger on for a long time to
come because of the imprecise nature of terrorism.
Factors Responsible for Terrorism in the Region
For several years, there have been scholarly analyses on security challenges as well as the
links between them and many grievances, such as marginalization, resource control,
unemployment, religious intolerance, and neglect of educational and health sectors. These factors
have heightened the spate of insecurity and insurgency in the subregion, including the
militarization of the entire political landscape by the military dictatorship that ruled for several
years in the area. The military regimes that dominated the region for several years lack the
capacity to develop the area, hence the case of millions of jobless youths. Money meant for
development was shipped out of the region by military leaders to their families living in various
European countries. The leadership of the military juntas also used misappropriated funds to buy
properties in choice cities around the world, rendering their countries impoverished. As a result,
there were no resources for the development of the region. Thus, it is argued that in developing
nations one of the root causes of terrorism is poverty.
A statistical distribution of poverty in Nigeria shows that northern Nigeria is more deeply
affected, with the North-Central States recording 67% poverty levels, North-West States at
71.1%, and North-East States 72.2% (Danjibo, 2011). It would not be out of place to suggest
therefore that poverty is so prevalent in Northern Nigeria as a result of injustice, lack of fairness
in policy, negligence on the part of the political class to develop education in that region, and an
imbalance in resource allocation. Unfortunately, this pervasive poverty plays out in a region that
historically had a culture derived from well-organised Islamic wars (Ahokegh: 2012). The
conspiracy between the colonial authority and the Nigerian elites at the inception of colonial
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administration through indirect rule has also impacted negatively on Nigerian sociopolitical
landscapes, especially in the north. Sanusi (2007: 181) has opined that:
One of the consequences of the alliance between the British and the emirates was that the
integrity of the political and social structures in the north could only be achieved by
sealing the region off from Western influences, including from southern Nigeria. In an
attempt to insulate the north from modernity, Western education was severely curtailed in
order to prevent in the north what Lord Lugard termed the “utter disrespect” for British
and natives’ ideals alike that was beginning to emerge in the south.
The northern part of Nigeria has therefore produced millions of uneducated elites who
could not understand why the security of a nation should be taken as a serious issue. It was not
surprising then that many of the youths who were jobless were a ready market for the recruitment
by the Boko Haram insurgents. The return of Nigeria to democratic rule after many years of
military dictatorship in 1999 was ushered in with high hope by Nigerians and the international
community for rapidly increased democratisation and socioeconomic development. This
expectation was not unfounded because democracy is about good governance. It is, however,
unfortunate that after 15 years of democratic rule in Nigeria, the country has not reaped the
dividend of democracy. In all respects, the Fourth Republic of Nigeria has been a paradox
(Unumen and Oghi, 2016).
The situation is not better in Chad, where about 11 million live in abject poverty. Since
independence, Chad has experienced social unrest, political instability, and conflicts with
neighbouring Sudan. These conflicts have destabilised the country’s infrastructure and, combined
with an unstable government, have led to a dire humanitarian situation. The Global Development
Report 2007 asserts Chad as the seventh poorest country in the world, and poverty is said to
affect 55% of the population, especially in the rural areas. The challenges of the wars in the
countries contiguous to Chad have compounded the situation as refugees from the Central
African Republic and IDPs from Sudan further overstress the already lean infrastructure on the
ground.
Western nations are believed to be peaceful and developed because of democratic culture
that brings about equal distribution of wealth, enables good governance and fast-track
development. The failure of improving on the livelihood of the people has brought much
discontent and an attitude of revolt from Nigerians, Chadians, Cameroonians and Nigeriens who
expected better opportunities than they have received. People believe that the governments of
these countries have undermined, under-developed and impoverished the vast majority of the
peoples.
Insecurity continues to spread in these countries because of the proliferation of small arms
and light weapons (SALW). Many West African countries have fought intra-state wars in which
small arms were the primary weapons. The disarmament of the combatants in these conflicts was
haphazardly done during demobilisation. It makes these weapons available to many people who
are not supposed to be in possession of arms. The availability of such weapons in the hands of the
wrong people has also impacted negatively on security in the Lake Chad subregion. The arms
illegally smuggled into the area through the unpoliced, porous borders have been used to commit
crimes against the state. One is therefore constrained to say that Boko Haram must have gotten
some of the weapons for its operations from this source. In this instance, Edeko (2014) has
observed that Nigeria alone is estimated to host over 70% of about 8 million illegal weapons in
the West African subregion due to the porosity of Nigerian borders. In Chad, procurement of
arms has heightened conflict in that country and facilitated human rights abuses. There is a risk in
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this because some of these arms smuggled out of government control into private hands are used
to cause confusion, and some transferred to the war-torn Darfur assist the rebels there. It is
estimated that importation of weapons by Chad was five times higher in 2004–2008 than in
1999–2003 (Wezeman, 2009).
Other factors that have contributed to the heightening of insecurity and insurgency in the
subregion include the militarization of the entire political landscape by the military dictatorship
that has ruled the countries for several years. In the seventies and eighties many of the West
African countries went through various military dictatorships that did little or nothing to develop
the region. In Cameroon, stay-put leadership has been a bane of development. Paul Biya, the
president, has been in government for more than three decades. The challenges that trailed this
development were lack of basic infrastructure, lack of employment for the youths, lack of
transparency and accountability, mismanagement of public funds, and poverty. The availability
of the jobless youths became commonplace in the region. Therefore, at the onset of every
insurgency, the youths are always available to be engaged by the insurgents.
Contrary to widely believed notions that democracy is beneficial to peace, Omilusi, M.
(2016:2) contends that democracy in Africa has increased the culture of impunity in some
people, while political differences have fuelled some of the violence that has erupted. The
frequent occurrence and manifestation of ethno-religious conflicts with the institutionalization of
democratic culture in Nigeria might be due to the democratic institutions’ and elected leaders’
failure to mitigate communal tensions and, in many instances, their exacerbation of conflict for
political gains. Thus, there is the need to be concerned about the impact of religious tensions on
Nigeria’s fragile democracy, as the growth and manifestation of democratic culture cannot thrive
in an atmosphere of disharmony.
Boko Haram Terror in the Lake Chad Basin
The exact date of emergence of the Boko Haram sect is not known. The only relative
facts about this sect are the accounts gathered from the media and scant extant academic
documentations. However, according to Onuoha (2010: 54-67), the emergence of Boko Haram
can be traced to 1995, when Abubakar Lawan established the Allusunna wal’jama’ah hijra sect
in the University of Maiduguri. Lawan then left the country for studies in Saudi Arabia at the
University of Medina and since then nothing has been heard about him. The sect gradually
developed, spreading to Adamawa, Bauchi, and Yobe, and eventually could be found not only in
many parts of northern Nigeria but also in the neighbouring countries of Chad, Cameroon and
Niger. The sect continued to move about with its slogan that Western education and civilisation
are sinful. The sect has concentrated on destroying government establishments because it
believes that the government imposes Western education on it, and it blames the government for
not managing the resources of the state for the benefit of the people.
Notwithstanding the conflicting accounts about the origin of the sect, most observers
agree that a 32-year-old charismatic Muslim cleric, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, established the sect
in 2002. The same account states that Yusuf also established a religious complex with a mosque
and Islamic boarding school in Maiduguri, Borno. A prayer group called “Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna
Lidda’awati wal Jihad,” loosely translated from Arabic as “people committed to the propagation
of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” (Chothia, 2011), was part of his legacy towards the
development of the sect. Since then the sect has flourished under various names like the Nigerian
Taliban, Yusufi yah sect, and Boko Haram. The name “Nigerian Taliban” is a derogatory name
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used to disparage the teachings and philosophy of the group. Though the actions and mode of
behaviour of the sect are fashioned after those of the Taliban in Afghanistan, there are no
accepted facts that they are affiliated (Onuoha, 2010).
The meaning of Boko Haram is literally: “Western education is forbidden.” The
ideological mission of Boko Haram is not in doubt. It clearly declared that it was to overthrow
the Nigerian state and impose a strict Islamic Sharia legal system in Nigeria. It was the
conviction of members of the sect that there were so many social vices in Nigeria that only an
Islamic legal system was capable of eradicating them. Boko Haram membership was drawn from
undergraduates, unemployed graduates, the unemployable, the underemployed, some extreme
radical Muslims, and the Almajiris (a group of young people, male and female, who search for
knowledge at home or in transit and display high moral behavior). The graduates are required to
show their loyalty and commitment by burning their degrees as part of their indoctrination, as
required by the movement (Njoku, 2011). The followers were, however, not restricted to Nigeria,
as foreigners from neighboring countries such as Chad, Cameroon, and Niger also joined.
While there is no doubt that the subregion has witnessed a series of threatening security
challenges, the activities of the Islamist sect—Boko Haram—remain unique in all ramifications.
The sect has demonstrated an unparalleled impunity of the highest order by openly claiming
responsibility for several bombings and sniper activities in northern and central Nigeria, thereby
placing the nation at the threshold of disintegration as suspicion and accusations between
Muslims and Christians continued to rage. The level of terror and destruction that Boko Haram
has unleashed on Nigeria has been devastating. The pattern of Boko Haram’s devastation and the
destruction arising from it has invariably undermined peace and security, not only in the country
but also in the Lake Chad Basin.
Implications of the Insurgency to Subregional Security
Boko Haram’s violent conflict in the Lake Chad Basin has continued. There are constant
raids and suicide bombings, creating fears and widespread trauma for people and preventing
them from assessing basic essential services, and damaging infrastructure. The Lake Chad Basin
harbors about 21 million inhabitants from Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. These people are
among the world’s poorest and most vulnerable. There has been the mind-boggling scenario of
food insecurity, and malnutrition has gotten to a critical level (UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, 2016). The territorial integrity of any nation is treated with reverence, and
no nation can afford to do otherwise. Without proper security to maintain territorial integrity,
every aspect of human endeavor, be it health, environment, food, economy, politics, or the social
and or physiological, stands to be greatly affected by the security or insecurity of that nation. In
recent times, the Lake Chad security environment has been bogged down with challenging
security issues championed by the Boko Haram insurgency. These terror attacks have had
negative implications for the socioeconomic and political health, as well as the security, of the
Lack Chad region.
The effect of Boko Haram terror on the security of the area cannot be overemphasised.
People are now being denied their fundamental human rights and cannot exercise freedom of
movement or worship for fear of being attacked by members of the sect. The planting and
carrying of explosives has been a common method of the sect. The most dangerous of the
activities of Boko Haram is the conscription of young boys and girls, who have been
brainwashed to believe that their heaven is assured if they die in the process of “fighting for
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Allah.” Sometimes they are even put under the influence of dangerous drugs to perform these
heinous acts. Boko Haram has created fear in the minds of the people. Churches and mosques
were bombed while people were worshipping. The almost simultaneous bomb explosions at St.
Theresa’s Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger state; Mountain of Fire and Miracles Church in Jos,
Plateau state; and Gadaka in Yobe state on Christmas day 2011 are still fresh in memory (Allen
and Silver, 2011).
Boko Haram has also put the military to shame and revealed its inadequacies. The
security situation became so precarious that the Nigerian leadership became suspicious of the
incompetence of their military commanders. This suspicion has led to their regular replacement.
The inadequacies and incompetence allegations were validated by Air Chief Marshal Alex
Badeh, former Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), who was quoted as saying that “the
military he headed lacked adequate equipment to fight Boko Haram.” Boko Haram has plunged
its area of operation into long-time insecurity and danger. Troops of the Nigerian Army have
reported cases of mines along the routes frequented by people, which only military engineers
have the technical knowledge to breach. It is, however, doubtful if the Nigerian Army engineers
have such sophisticated modern equipment. However, the defense spokesman, Major General
Chris Olukolade, has denied this allegation. In a report carried by Reuters (Abdallah, 2015), a
soldier was quoted as saying, “soldiers have retreated to Bama because of mines. They had been
on the road but that made them vulnerable, so they moved to the bush, but there are mines
planted there [too].” A member of a local vigilante group, Muhammad Mungonu, corroborated
the soldier’s statement as he said, “Three of our boys were killed by a landmine as we progressed
into Sambisa. We have suspended going farther” (Abdallah, 2015). An additional issue with
mines is that even after hostilities have ended, these mines will remain dangerous to the
inhabitants of the area. Europe and Asia are still grappling with mine-contaminated
environments long after the Second World War. Busé (2000) has contended that:
Explosives and mines from WWI and WWII still turn up on European and
Asian construction sites, backyard gardens, beaches, wildlife preserves and
former military training grounds . . . these discoveries are not isolated
incidents but are the result of hastily cleared ammunition dumps, training
ground, bombings and mine fields from these wars.
Another critical security issue is that hoodlums and other criminal gangs have hijacked
the situation to perpetrate their nefarious activities. Kidnapping has increased in the areas
affected by the insurgency. The case is assuming a dangerous dimension as criminal gangs have
taken advantage of the situation by planting bombs and kidnapping and killing innocent people
in the affected areas.
The Boko Haram insurgency has also exposed the security lapses of security outfits in the
subregion, especially those involved in information gathering. It has shown that the security
agencies are not adequately equipped with enough apparatus to gather information on impending
attacks to nip them in the bud. These lapses account for these agencies not being proactive
enough to expose planned attacks by the insurgents before they take place. The attacks on
institutions such as various police stations and the United Nations building in Abuja, or the
kidnapping of the Chibuk girls, were a result of this weakness.
As mentioned earlier, one of the causes of insurgency in Nigeria has been the massive
unemployment facing youths, which has provided a ready market for recruitment for the sect in
the subregion. Illiteracy compounds the already bad situation, a result of negligence in education
from the successive governments of the political elites of that part of West Africa. The situation
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has led to the closure of schools and the collapse of business activities in the region. Boko Haram
terrorism has resulted in a drastic reduction in economic investment in the subregion. For
instance, experts once described former President Goodluck Jonathan’s economic reforms as an
effort that may yield no result because of the pervasive woes in security in the country. It is
pertinent to mention that no serious business organisation will risk coming to invest in a
turbulent environment. In the wake of the crisis in the country, many international agencies and
countries began to issue travel warnings to their citizens about the dangers involved in visting
and doing business in some parts of the country. The government of the United States fired the
first shot of warning to its citizens about the risks of going to Nigeria. In particular, Akwa Ibom,
Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers, Abia, Edo, Imo, Jos, Bauchi, Gombe, Yobe, and Borno states, as well as
the Gulf of Guinea (Carson, 2012), were identified as hot spots. This situation has had grave
consequences for the economic development of the country, as the insurgency has further
damaged Nigeria’s profile as a desirable destination for investment, travel, tourism, scholarship,
and migration.
Furthermore, terrorism in the region has created uncertainty in business activities in the
country. Most foreigners willing to invest in Nigeria are now afraid to come to the country for
good and sustainable business engagements. The attacks of Boko Haram have caused a severe
drought in economic and commercial activities, as business activities are almost at a standstill.
Commercial banks now do brisk business, as they have reduced their working duration from
eight hours to just three. Awojobi (2014: 144-150), has opined that the frequent bombings and
clashes between the insurgents and the security agents have weighed heavily on the commercial
and business activities in the region, while many people have fled the area. In some locations,
business activities were paralysed. The spate of insecurity trailing the activities of Boko Haram
in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria has greatly stressed and imperilled a growing commercial
chain that was instrumental in the cooperation and integration process, which was the vision of
the founders of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in a fast globalising
economic and political order.
The economic impact of terrorism on security is, therefore, multifaceted. Investors
naturally evade areas perceived to be a potential source of terrorist attacks. In Borno and Yobe
states in the North-East, Nigeria, the people that go to the fish and beans markets have dwindled
due to fear of attack by terrorists. Apenda and Tough (2015) noted that farmers who produce
onions, rice, maize, livestock, pepper, and fish have all fled the Lake Chad region. Baga market,
known for fish trading, has been forced to close for security reasons. The effect of the closure of
these markets on food safety is unprecedented as neighbouring states also felt the scarcity of the
items, which resulted in the increase of prices of these food items. The strategy of violence of the
Boko Haram has also caused the massive displacement of people of large-scale agricultural and
fishing communities from their original habitat to other settlements. These displaced people were
responsible for the production of essential materials needed for exchange in the international
trade relations among the adjacent neighbours in the region (Awodola and Ayuba, 2015).
The Boko Haram insurgency has reportedly forced not less than 1.5 million people out of
their homes to seek safety in other parts of the country. Another 150,000 have also taken refuge
in neighbouring Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Although Nigeria ratified the African Union
Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in Africa on
April 17, 2012 (AUCPAIDP, 2012), as of April 2016 the federal cabinet had yet to adopt the
policy, despite persistent advocacy on the issue. The IDPs, therefore, continue to live in cramped
and unhygienic conditions. The most vulnerable IDPs—the young, older people and those with
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disabilities—are most at risk and have been significantly affected by the spread of poliovirus. In
2012, there was a significant reduction in the spread of polio in Nigeria; however, in 2014,
Nigeria experienced an increased outbreak of type 2 poliovirus (cVDPV2) with 29 cases across
five states. The distribution of these cases are: 14 cases in Borno, 10 cases in Kano, two cases in
Yobe, one case in Katsina, and two cases in Jigawa, up from five cases in 2013 (NPHDA, 2015:
4). The increase in the outbreak of this disease followed restricted access to the area for health
workers, caused by the fear of being attacked by insurgents. This situation has become a great
concern to Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger, which have declared the situation a health
emergency that requires quick attention to stem its global spread (UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2016).
Apart from the epidemiological disaster confronted by IDPs, they also, in the long run,
face severe trauma due to extended stays in unsuitable environments. The result of this can be
multi-dimensional. They could become destitute after returning from displaced persons’ camps
and never go back to normal life. Research on the conditions of IDPs has shown that IDPs are
targets of violence or pawns in military conflict and face armed attacks, killings, abductions,
injuries, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). All of these effects are a common
phenomenon in IDP camps in this area. In addition, Boko Haram’s insurgency has drastically
affected the tourism industry in the subregion. According to research conducted by Adejoh and
Fada (2014), terrorist attacks have reduced the number of tourists visiting the countries affected
by terrorism. The report indicated the cancellation of many national and international events in
these geopolitical zones. For instance, the Nigerian premier leagues between different clubs
within the country faced a setback, as clubs from the southern part of Nigeria were unwilling to
go to places like Jigawa, Bauch, and Kano, located in the north, for their matches. The
insurgency also led to the cancellation of an international football match between the Nigeria
Super Eagles and their Samba Boys counterparts from Brazil in 2012. Nigeria, being a footballloving country, lost much due to these cancellations.
The north east of Nigeria also houses the famous Yankari game reserve and the Mambila
Plateau, which used to attract tourists and investors from different parts of the world before Boko
Haram’s insurgency. These tourist centers have lost a great deal in the wake of Boko Haram,
leading to unemployment as employees abandoned their various duty posts for fear of being
attacked. In Cameroon, Boko Haram has caused a steady decline in visitors to Waza National
Park, Cameroon’s largest game reserve. According to Tourism Ministry spokesman Serge Eric
Epoune, people used to come in their thousands, but that number has dwindled because people
fear for their lives. It has therefore threatened the financial infrastructure of Cameroon (Ngala,
2015). The situation in this subregion has become worrisome; aside from the massive
socioeconomic implications, the human cost is unquantifiable. It is, even more, disturbing in an
area that is in dire need of development in all facets of human endeavours.
Curbing Insurgency in the Subregion
Nigeria initially saw the Boko Haram insurgency as a strictly internal problem which it
thought could be taken care of without external influence. This assertion is not contestable
considering the political, economic, military and population of the country. But with large
swathes of many territories falling into the hands of the insurgents, Nigeria had no option but to
cooperate with the neighboring countries to form the Multi-National Task Force (MNJTF). The
activities of the sect prompted the subregion to establish the MNJTF, comprising soldiers from
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Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon as granted by the African Union in February 2016. The
response of the adjacent countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon was spontaneous as they
agreed without much persuasion to join in contributing to the MNJTF (Théroux-Bénoni, 2016).
The MNJTF, with its headquarters in Ndjamena, has been able to canalize the insurgents and
restrict them within the Sambisa forest as the push against them was on all fronts. The present
situation sees the fighting deescalating given the successes that the MNJTF has achieved. For
instance, the cases of bombing have drastically reduced since the line of supply of the insurgents
had been cut. They now lack food and ammunition, and even communication to the outside
world seems to have been reduced. Other achievements of the MNJTF include an improvement
of the security situation as many of the territories hitherto controlled by the insurgents have been
taken back and people are returning home. One achievement is the recent release of 21 Chibok
school girls abducted two years ago.
The activities of the region have received a boost from the international community. The
United States government in August 2016 offered over $37 million to the Lake Chad Basin for
humanitarian assistance. The United Nations Regional Coordinator in assessing the situation said
the region would require at least $559 million in the next four months to ease the crisis in the
area (Channels Television, October 14, 2016).

Panacea for Insurgency in the Subregion
It is a fact of history that development thrives in a peaceful environment. Consequently,
all hands must be on deck to ensure peace and stem the tide of Boko Haram’s terrorism from
Nigeria and her neighbors. It is quite evident that this subregion has not fared well in its quest for
an industrial and technological breakthrough since independence, and this has forced these
nations to rely on importation for virtually everything; terrorism will only worsen the situation.
Consequently, it is necessary for governments at all levels to create an enabling environment for
investment and industrial growth by ensuring the security of lives and property in the country.
Boko Haram terrorism, which has created palpable fear and a meaningful sense of
insecurity in the polity and undermined the country’s growth and development, should be tackled
with all seriousness by the government. Security agencies, especially those concerned with
intelligence gathering and analysis, must be empowered, motivated, and adequately mobilized to
combat criminality and insecurity.
Also, effective legislation that will adequately punish offenders and deter potential
criminals must be put in place. A situation where criminals are offered amnesty and put on
bumper payroll will not only undermine security but also encourage more people to enter into
criminality with the expectations of amnesty and consequent monthly remunerations from the
government, just for being repentant criminals. An example of this is the Niger Delta Amnesty
Programme and the proposed offer of amnesty to Boko Haram insurgents (Adebayo, 2014). The
government can, however, do better by providing social amenities.
There should be proper coordination of border patrol, and efficient regulation of the
influx of immigrants among the member nations of the Lake Chad Basin into their countries to
forestall the recruitment into criminal gangs. The Lake Chad Basin governments should, as a
matter of urgency, conduct a credible national population census and national identity
registration to ensure that their nationals are easily identified anywhere they go.
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There is the need for the government to embark on poverty alleviation programs that will
impact positively on the lives of the people. The improved physical, social, and psychological
quality of life of a society and its members, both in a domestic setting and within the larger
regional and global system, will give the citizens a deeper sense of patriotism. Accordingly, the
government must introduce elements that have the capacity to provide the citizens with
economic, social, and political conditions that would ensure happiness and relative prosperity.
Security awareness should be made inclusive. There should be a massive orientation of all
citizens, regardless of their level of education, to be aware of the importance of the security of
the country and ensure they place it above any personal interests. The tranquillity and well-being
of any society are necessary components of national security.
The devastating decline of youth unemployment is an issue that needs to be critically
addressed by the governments of these nations. The generation of employment for the teeming
population is a critical problem that requires the urgent attention of the government, vigorously
and aggressively pursued. The engagement of unemployed youths would automatically result in
depletion in the number of youths always readily available for recruitment into various criminal
gangs. The inference is that the reduction of youth unemployment will translate to a reduction in
crime and engender national sustainable development. Youths are an important segment of the
society, who should be encouraged to channel their energies into productive ventures that can
lead to national development by being positively engaged in the system and discouraged from
activities that could be detrimental to the growth of the country. Therefore, every action taken
towards youth employment is a step towards crime reduction, as well as towards national
development.
Governments of the Lake Chad Basin Area must eschew corruption in the fight against
criminality and insecurity. Overzealous government officials should not squander security
budgets both at state and federal levels, but rather adequately utilize funds for combating security
challenges. The citizens regularly paying their taxes and fulfilling other state obligations should
be well compensated and protected by the state agencies responsible for such tasks. To this
extent, the current charges against the former National Security Adviser (NSA) to the
government of Nigeria for involvement in a scandal focusing on the mismanagement of money
meant for procurement of weapons for fighting the insurgency should not be swept under the
carpet.
There must be sincerity on the part of government functionaries to ensure judicious use of
funds meant for the security of lives and property. The government must address critically and
pragmatically the issue of the Almajiris in the subregion. However, in recent times they have
become street urchins and a menace to society. It should be reformed to make the children in the
system useful to both themselves and society when they grow older. To this end, education must
be given priority, aggressively pursued, and made compulsory for all children, including the
physically challenged.
Conclusion
The economy of the Lake Chad Basin has been adversely affected by the Boko Haram
insurgency. Insecurity has been heightened in the subregion as the Islamists scaled up their
deadly attacks in the area. The insurgency has hampered the once thriving economy and peaceful
coexistence of the people of the area. It has significantly changed the financial structure of the
Lake Chad Basin as so much is committed to fighting the insurgency. The subregion has
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however improved on their cooperation to enhance the security in the area with the formation of
the MNJTF to fight the insurgents.
There is need to improve on mutual intelligence that would builds trust among the
governments of the subregion and could efficiently improve the lives of the people. There is the
need for an inclusive dialogue that will involve all clans and ethnic groups on security and
stability in the subregion. The Lake Chad Basin nations, especially Nigeria, need to do more to
ensure good life for its people. Winning the war against the Boko Haram insurgency therefore
requires more than military action but providing social amenities that can make life meaningful
to the people. If governments in this subregion take advantage of the vast human and material
resources, both military and non-military, financial and social, the Lake Chad Basin will soon
become a bastion of hope.
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